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IMPRISONMENT OF INDIGENTS FOR NON-PAYMENT
OF FINES OR COURT COSTS; THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATION THAT WILL PROVIDE
PROTECTION TO THE POOR

INTRODUCTION
"The custom of imprisoning a convicted defendant for nonpayment of fines dates back to medieval England."' In this country
the practice has become so pervasive that at the present time almost all states, as well as the Federal Government, have statutes
authorizing incarceration under such circumstances. 2 For example,
the North Dakota Century Code provides:
A judgment that the defendant pay a fine and costs also may
direct that he be imprisoned until both the fine and costs
are satisfied, specifying the extent of the imprisonment,
which must not exceed one day for every two dollars of the
fine and costs, but such imprisonment does not discharge the
judgment for the fine and costs."
The North Dakota statute differs from the majority of state
statutes in that the imprisonment does not discharge the duty to pay
the fine.' However, the amount of the fine is used to determine the
length of confinement: "[T]he imprisonment. . . must not exceed
one day for every two dollars of the fine and costs. ' 5 The difference between the statutes that discharge the fine and those that do
not is important when it is necessary to determine the purpose of the particular statute.6 Those statutes that provide for dis1.
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(1883). See also Comment, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty
Days", 67 CALIF. L. REv. 778, 780-87 (1969).
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See also Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for

Nonpayment of Fines, 64 MICH. L. REV. 938 (1966); Comment, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 778,
(1969) supra note 1, for compilations of these statutes. The corresponding federal statutes
are 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565, 3569 (1964).
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-21 (1960).
4. See e.g., S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 23-48-23 (1969).
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-21 (1960).
6. The distinction has been important primarily with regard to an analysis of whether
the statute has a rational purpose that will withstand the test of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
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charge of the fine by imprisonment appear to be a substitute punishment. On the other hand, the statutes which do not discharge the
fine by incarceration seem more likely to have been intended as a
means of compelling the offender to pay his fine.1
In order to appreciate the broad potential application of statutes
calling for imprisonment for nonpayment of fines, it should be kept
in mind that the fine is the most frequently imposed criminal sanction.a Conceivably, every offender subject to a fine might be imprisoned for nonpayment under these statutes. When the nonpayment
is a wilful refusal to comply with the order of a court, it is analogous
to any ordinary contempt of court violation, and imprisonment for
such defiance is not necessarily undesirable. However, when the
person imprisoned is financially unable to pay the fine, which is often
the case, it seems that the visceral reaction should be that incarceration is unduly harsh and unfair treatment. This imprisonment
seems especially unfair when the court is able to confine an offender
beyond the period the legislature has established as the maximum
punishment for the crime, merely because the offender is too poor
to pay a fine. For example, assume that a North Dakota defendant
is convicted of driving an automobile while under the influence of
alcohol. North Dakota law provides that the offense be punished by
a maximum fine of two-hundred dollars, or a maximum jail sentence of thirty days, or both.9 If the defendant were sentenced to the
maximum fine of two-hundred dollars, but was unable to pay, the
court would then be able to imprison him for 100 days (at the North
Dakota statutory rate of $2 credit per day), even though the legislature has manifested its intention that thirty days be the maximum
period of confinement for those convicted of that offense. 10 The unfairness inherent in such imprisonment, and the frequency of its occurrence,"' have compelled the courts to re-examine their former
7. North Dakota does have provision for dimunition of fines by the labor to be performed by an imprisoned offender. "For each day of labor performed by a convict under
the provisions of this chapter, there shall be credited on any judgment for fine and costs
against him the sum of five dollars." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-44-33 (Supp. 1971).
8. It has been estimated that fines constitute 75% of all sentences. E. SUTHERLAND
& D. CRESSEY, PRINCIPALS OF CRIMINOLOGY 572 (6th ed. 1960). Although not documented,
such estimates are not implausible given the large number of traffic and other minor offenses that come within the scope of the criminal law, and are almost exclusively dealt
with by the imposition of a fine. The fine is not limited to minor offenses. It can be imposed as the sole penalty for infractions ranging in gravity from holding a dance on
Sunday, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-21-19 (Supp. 1971), to voluntary manslaughter, 18 U.S.C.
j 1112 (1964).
9. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(2)
(Supp. 1971).
10. See People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966)
which involved similar circumstances. The case is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 18-22 infra. Under recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court confinement
of an indigent beyond the statutory maximum for nonpayment of his fine or court
costs is no longer oonstitutionally possible. Williams v. IlL, 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970).
11. The 1910 Census reported that 58.6% of all inmates of the United States prisons
were committed for nonpayment of fines. More recent figures from large city jails appear
to show that the percentage of inmates doing time for nonpayment of fines has remained
extremely high. See 57 CALIF. L. PEv. 778, 787 (1969) ; Note, Fines and Fining-An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1013, 1014 (1953).

NOTES

policy of upholding such confinement and to consider the present
legality of the long accepted practice of imprisoning convicted defendants who fail to pay their fines or court costs.
IMPRISONMENT OF INDIGENTS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW
Defendants imprisoned for failure to pay their fines have long
argued that such imprisonment was unconstitutional. 12 However,
these arguments were generally unsuccessful. 13 Most recent cases
that have held the incarceration of the defendant unconstitutional
have involved defendants who were indigent, i.e., unable to pay
1 4
the fine imposed.
Even before the right of an indigent to avoid imprisonment for
nonpayment of a fine had been elevated to a constitutional right by
the United States Supreme Court,'15 several courts had found ways
to abrogate the practice. The reasons given for finding such incarceration illegal ranged from finding the sentence unauthorized by
statute, 6 to holding the statute authorizing such confinement violative of one or more of the defendant's constitutional rights.1
In People v. Saffore, 5 the leading case before the United States
12. N.D. CoMP. LAWS OF 1913, § 10941, the predecessor of N.D. CENT. CODE §
29-26-21 (1960), was challenged in State v. Kilmer, 31 N.D. 442, 153 N.W. 1089 (1915)
where it was held not to violate either the State or Federal Constitutions.
13. Id. at 1090.
14. The question of who qualifies as an indigent for any particular purpose is always
a difficult one.
The determination of indigency in Cook County [Illinois] generally consists of two questions in open court, asked by the judge: "Do you have a
lawyer?" And if not, "Do you have funds with which to hire a lawyer?" The
prevailing attitude of the Illinois judges toward the determination of indigency reflects the practice most often followed: if the defendant has not
made bail by the time of arrangement, and if he says he is unable to hire a
lawyer and wants one, then the court assumes that the defendant is indigent
and freely appoints counsel for him. If the defendant were financially able,
it is assumed, he would most probably have secured his release on bail and
have retained his own attorney. The trial judges generally are not concerned
with whether relatives of a defendant are able to employ counsel for the
defendant because there is no legal obligation upon relatives to hire an attorney for him, regardless of the degree of kinship. However, rather common factors considered by many judges in determining indigency are employment of the accused and whether he owns an automobile or other valuable
property."
Dowling & Yantis, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in Illinois, 47 CH. B REc.
216, 219 (1966).
The term "indigent" defies precise definition. Certainly it cannot be based on a
stated minimum dollar amount of assets. This is especially true when determining defendant's status for purposes of assessing a fine. In this situation the status should be
determined on the basis of the adequacy of the defendant's resources in relation to the
fine. In regard to the determination of indigency with respect to right to counsel, See
generally Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47
MINN. L. Rlv. 1054, 1073-74 (1963) ; Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 579-80 (1963); Note, Representation of Indigents in California-A Field Studyy of the Public Defender and Assigned
Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. ItEv. 522, 545 (1961).
15. Williams v. IlL, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), discussed in the text accompanying notes 29-52 infra.
16. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).
17. Note 26 infra.
18. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).
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Supreme Court spoke out on the issue, the New York Court of Appeals avoided determining the constitutional issues by holding that
the imprisonment of the indigent defendant for nonpayment of his
fine was unauthorized under New York law. The defendant had pleaded guilty to charges of third degree assault and was given the maximum sentence of one year and a fine of $500, which, if not paid,
was to be served at the rate of one day for each dollar. The defendant was an indigent, which was known to the sentencing court. It
had taken this fact into account in assigning counsel for him, but
disregarded it in assessing the fine. The Court of Appeals asserted
that under New York law, imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine
is not part of the punishment for the offense, but a means of enforcing payment. 9 Therefore, the court concluded: "[I]t runs directly contra to the meaning and intent of section 484 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure2o to order a defendant to stay in prison until he
'2
pays a fine, when the court knows that he cannot possibly pay it." '
The court construed the statute as calling for the imprisonment of
those who refuse to pay their fines, but as not having been intended
to apply to those who are unable to pay. Thus, the decision did not
place the right of an indigent to avoid imprisonment for nonpayment
on a constitutional footing. However, the court did say in dictum that
"[lit is a denial of due process and of equal protection of the law
to let a defendant's lack of money determine how long he must be
'22
imprisoned.
In Sawyer v. District of Columbia,23 the defendant appealed his
sentence for jaywalking on the grounds that it constituted a violation
of his right to equal protection as well as a proscription of excessive
fines. The maximum imprisonment for the offense was 10 days in
jail. The trial court knew of the defendant's indigency but nevertheless imposed a fine of $150 or, in default thereof, a penalty of 60 days
in jail. The District of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals, in accord with People v. Saffore,2 4 found that the purpose of the statute
19. New York had established that imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine was merely
a means of collection In Matter of McKinney v. Hamilton, 282 N.Y. 393, 26 N.E.2d 949
(1940).
20. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §§ 484, 718 (McKinney 1958) provided that if a sentence
of imprisonment and a fine was imposed and the fine was unpaid at the expiration of
the prison sentence, it was to be served out at the rate of one day in prison for each
dollar remaining unpaid. These statutes were repealed by N.Y. LAWS ch. 681, §§ 66, 82
(1967). New York has altered the statute since that time. See N.Y. CODE OF CraIm. PRoc.
§ 470-e (McKinney Supp. 1970).
21. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 687, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972
(1966). But see People v. Windes, 283 Ill. 251, 119 N.E. 297, 298 (1918), where the Illinois Supreme Court said of a similar statute, "The statute was intended to enable the
state to collect in labor fines that could not be collected by execution, and applies as
well to a case where a person is able to pay In labor but not in money as to a case
where he Is able to pay in money but is unwilling to do so."
22. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).
The court also raised the possibility that the fine was excessive, in violation of the eighth
amendment prohibition against excessive fines.
23. Sawyer v. Dist. of Col., 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. App. 1968).
24. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).

NOTES

authorizing such imprisonment was to enforce collection. It there-

fore held that imprisoning one unable to pay a fine, since it cannot
possibly serve to enforce collection, is an abuse of a court's discretion. The court limited its holding to those instances in which the
resulting period of confinement exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment which could be levied under the substantive statute as

25
an original sentence.

Other cases have held imprisonment for nonpayment violative of
one or several of the indigent's constitutional rights.28 One early

case held that the portion of a sentence for embezzlement ordering
confinement in default of payment of the fine was cruel and unusual
punishment.2 7 Although the defendant in that case was apparently
not an indigent, his sentence to a fine of $576,853.74 is analogous to
fining a person without funds. Ordered to confinement in the county
jail until payment, the order provided that the additional confinement
was not to exceed 288,426 days. On the basis of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the court

modified the sentence by reversing that portion imposing the fine,
as well as the provision for confinement until payment thereof. 28
THE SUPREME COURT CASES
In Williams v. Illinois,29 the Supreme Court of the United States
resolved the existing conflict in the decisions throughout the country
25. Sawyer v. Dist of Col., 238 A.2d 314, 317 (D.C. App. 1968). In re Petition
of Cole, 17 Ohio App. 2d 207, 245 N.E.2d 384 (1968) cited Sawyer as authority for the
proposition that sentencing an indigent to pay a fine or in the alternative, to serve a
Jail term longer than that provided in the statute under which the indigent was charged,
is an abase of discretion by the trial court.
26. Spinler v. State, 446 P.2d 429 (Mont. 1968) (equal protection); State v. Allen,
104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70 (1969), aff'd without reaching this point, 54 N.J. 311,
255 A.2d 221 (1969) (equal protection and due process). See Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rev. 341, 362-65 (1949) where it is a rgued
that due process and equal Protection are blurred into one so that a violation of equal
protection is also a violation of due process. Cf. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. R v. 1065 (1969).
Other constitutional arguments included that imprisonment of indigents in default
on fines or court costs violated the eighth amendment prohibition against excessive
fines. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966) (dictum) ;
Cf. State v. Staub, 182 La. 1040, 162 So. 766, 768 (1935). Another eighth amendment
argument was that the proscription on "cruel and unusual punishment" applied to imprisoning an offender for his inability to pay a fine. See Comment. 57 CALIF. L. REv.
778, 803, 806 (1969). As the author points out, if imprisonment is considered a means of
compelling payment the question of cruel and unusual punishment should arise under
recent decisions holding punishment for a status or conduct beyond the defendant's control unconstitutional. E.g., Robinson v. Cal., 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (it is cruel and unusual
punishment to punish a defendant for his status as a drug addict). Poverty, like drug
addiction, is a status beyond the control of the individual. The argument that imprisonment for nonpayment violated the various state constitutional restrictions against Imprisonment for debt has been dismissed as tenuous on the basis of the long recognized
distinction between the two phrases as terms of art. However, the practice of confining
indigent offenders for nonpayment of fines has been termed an archaic system akin to
imprisonment for debt. People v. McMillan, 53 Misc. 2d 685, 279 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1967).
27.
State v. Ross, 55 Or. 450, 104 P. 596 (1909), modified on rehearing, 55 Or. 474,
106 P. 1022 (1910), writ of error dismissed 227 U.S. 150 (1913).
28. State v. Ross, 55 Or. 474, 106 P. 1022 (1910).
29. Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
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by holding that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment an indigent offender who fails to pay his fine
cannot be imprisoned beyond the maximum statutory period
set for the substantive offense.30 The defendant had been convicted of petty theft and given the maximum sentence of
one year in prison plus a $500 fine and $5 in court costs. The judgment provided that if he had not paid the monetary obligations by
the expiration of the one year sentence, he would have to remain in
jail and work them off at the rate of $5 per day.3' The Supreme
Court of Illinois rejected the defendant's argument that an indigent
is denied equal protection of the laws when he is imprisoned for
failure to fulfill the monetary obligations of his sentence.3 2 In reversing, the United States Supreme Court noted that the appellant
would be imprisoned 101 days beyond the maximum period of confinement set by statute3 3 and stated:
A state has wide latitude in fixing the punishment for state
crimes. Thus, appellant does not assert that Illinois could
not have appropriately fixed the penalty, in the first instance, at one year and 101 days. Nor has the claim been
advanced that the sentence imposed was excessive in light
of the circumstances of the commission of this particular offense. However, once the State has defined the outer limits
of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests
and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the
34
statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency.
(Emphasis added)
The sentence was not imposed upon the defendant because of his
indigency, but because he had committed a crime. However, the
court, quoting Griffin v. Illinois,3 opined that "a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation." 3 6
Thus the Court recognized that the sentence must be tailored to fit
the offender and not merely the crime.3 7 Accordingly, it held that
30. Id. at 240-241. This holding recognized the distinction between default confinement that serves to extend imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum term of Imprisonment, and those situations in which the term of incarceration remains within the
statutory limits. For an earlier argument that such a distinction is unwarranted, see the
dissenting opinion of Conford, S.J.A.D., in State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d
70 (1969).
31. This provision in the judgment was authorized by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(k)
(1967).
32. People v. Williams, 41 111. 2d 511, 24,4 N.E.2d 197 (1969).
33. Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235, 237 (1970).
34. Id. at 241-42.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
35. Griffin v. Ill.,
36. Williams v. Ill.,399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970). "On its face the statute extends to
all defendants an apparently equal opportunity for limiting confinement to the statutory
maximum simply by satisfying a money judgment. LIn fact, this is an illusory choice for
Williams or any indigent who, by definition, is without funds."
37. Id. at 243. "The Constitution permits qualitative differences in meting out punishment and there Is no requirement that persons convicted of the same offense receive Identical sentences."

NOTES

under the Equal Protection Clause, the statutory ceiling placed on
imprisonment for any substantive offense must be the same for all
defendants irrespective of their economic status.3 8
Despite the Court's failure to explicitly declare what equal protection test it employed in arriving at its conclusion,"9 it did, for the
first time, place the right of an indigent to avoid imprisonment for
nonpayment of a fine or court costs on a constitutional basis. However, the Court expressly limited its equal protection holding to situations in which the effect of the imprisonment would be to keep
40
the indigent incarcerated beyond the statutory maximum.
In spite of the limitation of the Williams decision to incarcerations
beyond the statutory maximum, a concurring opinion in a companion case 4 1 in which four justices joined, made it clear that the same
principles applied in Williams might compel a holding that the imprisonment of indigents was unconstitutional in other situations where
he was essentially being punished for his status, something over
which he has no control:
[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in Williams
also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term and whether or not the jail term
of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may
be imposed on a person willing and able to pay a fine. In
each case, the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting
it into a jail term solely because the defendant
is indigent
4 2
and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.
Less than a year later the Court was presented with the case of
Tate v. Short 4 3 which expanded the precedent set in Williams by

in

38.
Id. at 238 n.7, 259. Several constitutional arguments had been raised by Williams
his appeal. Besides contending that every instance of default imprisonment violates

either the Equal Protection and/or Due Process Clause(s), he asserted that the $5 per
diem figure for "working off" the fine was unreasonable and irrational. Mr. Justice Harlan, In concurring in the result, preferred to judge the legislation on the basis of due
process, I.e., whether it arbitrarily infringed upon a constitutionally protected right of
the defendant. In

his view, the equal protection argument espoused by the majority was a

'wolf in sheep's clothing,' for that rationale Is no more than a masquerade of a supposedly objective standard for subjective judicial judgment as to what state legislation
offends notions of 'fundamental fairness'." See also Tussman & tenBroek, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 362-65 (1949) (due process and equal protection tend to merge) ; Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
39. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
40.
Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).

(1969).

[NJothing we now hold precludes a Judge from imposing on an Indigent, as
on any defendant, the maximum penalty prescribed by law.
It bears emphasis that our holding does not deal with a judgment of confinement for nonpayment of a fine in the familiar pattern of alternative
sentence of '$30 or 30 days'. We hold only that a State may not constitutionally Imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant
who is financially unable to pay a fine.
41. Morris v. Schoonfleld, 399 U.S. 508 (1970) (concurring opinion).
42. Id. at 509.
43. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
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adopting the reasoning in the concurring opinion quoted above." In
that case the defendant had accumulated fines of $425 on nine convictions in the Corporation Court of Houston, Texas, for traffic offenses. He was unable to pay the fines because of indigency and the
Corporation Court, which otherwise had no jurisdiction to impose
prison sentences, committed him to the municipal prison farm according to the provisions of a state statute and municipal ordinance
which required that he remain there a sufficient time to satisfy the
fines at the rate of five dollars for each day.45 This meant that he
would have to serve 85 days at the prison farm. He applied to the
County Criminal Court of Harris County for a writ of habeas corpus
after 21 days in custody, and he was released on bond. The County
Court denied the application and the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas affirmed the denial." The Supreme Court reversed, thereby
expanding the precedent set in Williams v. Illinois:4 7
The Illinois statute involved in Williams authorized both a
fine and imprisonment. .

.

. We held that the Illinois statute

as applied to Williams worked an invidious discrimination
solely because he was too poor to pay the fine, and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Although the instant case involves offenses punishable by
fines only, petitioner's imprisonment for nonpayment constitutes precisely the same unconstitutional discrimination since,
like Williams, petitioner was subjected
to imprisonment sole4
ly because of his indigency. 8
A wealthier defendant could have avoided incarceration in Tate, as
in Williams, merely by paying the fine. The person who is unable to
pay does not have the same choice of purchasing his freedom. 9 He
44. Id. at 898.
45. TEX. CODE O CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.43 (Vernon's 1966).
46. Ex Varte Tate, 445 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969).
47. Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235, 24,1-43 (1970).
48. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1971).
49. In Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for
the court, said: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." As has been pointed out, it is also true that
equal justice is denied when the kind of sentence a man gets is determind by his wealth.
45 TUL. L. Rav. 627, 631 (1971). In Griffin the Court held that it was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause to fail to provide an indigent criminal defendant with a trial
transcript at public expense in order to prosecute a first appeal from a criminal conviction. Since that time there has been an almost continuous flow of decisions from the
Supreme Court in the area of cconstitutional rights of indigent defendants. See Eskridge
v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958)
(full appellate review available to all
defendants); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
(indigents can be exempt from paying
filing fees to begin appeal) ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for writ of
habeas corpus unconstitutional when applied to indigents) ; Draper v. Wash., 372
U.S. 487 (1963) (appellate review cannot be deemed frivolous because of defendant's
indigency) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (State must provide counsel for
indigents at trial court); Douglas v. Cal., 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(indigent Is entitled
to counsel at first appeal at state's expense) ; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (writs
of coram nobis) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (declared a

NOTES

is forced to give up his freedom because of a status over which he
has no control.
The state cannot achieve its purpose of compelling payment by
imprisoning those unable to pay. 50 On the contrary, imprisonment
of indigents for nonpayment may be counterproductive. The President's Commission on Riots and Civil Disorders 51 has reported that
the general distrust of the judicial system which is prevalent in
ghetto areas, where income is lowest, has helped to increase the
level of crime.
have lost the confidence of the
Some of our courts.
poor..
.. The belief is pervasive among ghetto residents that
lower courts. . . dispense "assembly-line" justice; that from

arrest to sentencing, the poor and uneducated are denied
equal justice with the affluent, that procedures such as...
fines have been perverted to perpetuate class inequities....
[T]he apparatus of justice in some areas has itself become a focus for distrust and hostility. Too often the courts
than relieve the tensions
have operated to aggravate rather
52
that ignite and fire disorders.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
The Supreme Court did not make clear in Williams what equal
protection test it employed in reaching its decision. 53 The Court may
have judged the legislation by the "traditional test," which requires
that classifications made by state law bear some rational nexus to
a legitimate state objective. 54 A decision of unconstitutionality could
have been supported on the basis of the traditional equal protection
test on the ground that the legitimate objective of the state was
compelling payment of a fine, and that the objective could not be
achieved by imprisoning one who is unable to pay. The Court may
have also used the so-called stricter test in arriving at its conclusion.
In applying the stricter test the Court has more closely scrutinized
state statutes when a "suspect classification" or "fundamental interest" is involved and has required the state to show a compelling
state poll tax unconstitutional because it excluded indigents from voting on the basis of
(indigent must
their inability to pay a fee); Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
have counsel who will advocate his cause); Coleman v. Ala., 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (defendant must have counsel at preliminary hearing).
50. "Imprisonment in such a case is not imposed to further any penal objective of
the State. It is imposed to augment the State's revenues but obviously does not serve
that purpose; the defendant cannot pay because he is indigent and his imprisonment,
rather than aiding collection of the revenue, saddles the State with the cost of feeding
and housing him for the period of his imprisonment." Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399
(1971).
51.

REPORT OF THE NAT'L

ADVISORY

COMM'N ON

CIVIL DISORDERS

(1968).

52. Id. at 337.
53. 16 Viii. L. REv. 754, 753 (1971).
54. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065, 1077-87
(1969).
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interest that justifies the law as such, and the distinctions created
by the law must be necessary to further the state's purpose. 55 Indigency might have been considered a "suspect classification" as has
been race and alienage, 56 or the right to avoid imprisonment a
"fundamental interest," to justify the use of the stricter test.5 7 The
Court's finding that the state statutes in Williams and Tate were unconstitutional as applied to the particular defendants could have
rested on the stricter test since it seems unlikely that a state could
sustain the burden of showing that imprisonment of those unable to
pay can further its asserted purpose of compelling payment of unpaid fines.
Thus it seems that a holding of unconstitutionality in Williams
and Tate could have been fairly derived from the application of
either the traditional equal protection test, or the stricter test. However, the fact that the Court did not indicate which equal protection
test it relied upon makes it a difficult task for the lower courts to
apply the Williams and Tate decisions. 5
A further difficulty in ascertaining the current state of the law
is the question of whether the lower courts will follow that portion
of the Court's opinion in Tate which declares imprisonment of indigents for nonpayment of fines unconstitutional "whether or not the
jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may
be imposed on a person willing and able to pay." This statement is quoted from the opinion of Justice White in Morris v.
55. Id. at 1087-1121. The Supreme Court of California had already applied the stricter
test in a case involving imprisonment of an indigent for nonpayment of a fine. In re
Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970). The court reasoned that
the United States Supreme Court had tended to apply the "traditional test" only in areas
such as economic regulation where judicial restraint is considered essential. It felt that
the stricter test was appropriate where a "suspect classification" or "fundamental interest" was involved.
56. See e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
57. Although the California court indicated in In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d
999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970), that the presence of either a "suspect classification" or a
"fundamental interest" would call for the use of the stricter test, decisions of the United
States Supreme Court may require more. Note, Developments in the Law---Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rxv. 1065, 1120-21 (1969):
The interaction of these two factors ["suspect classifications" and "fundamental interests"] can be visualized by imagining two gradients. Along the
first . . . is a hierarchy of classifications, with those which are most invidious-suspect classifications based on traits such as race-at the top.
Along the second, arranged in ascending order of importance, are interests
such as employment, education, and voting. When the classification drawn
lies at the top of the first gradient, it will be subject to strict review even
when the interest it affects ranks low on the second gradient-for example,
the denial of a driver's license on the basis of race. As the nature of the
classification becomes less invidious . . . the measure will continue to elicit
strict review only as it affects interests progressively more important ...
Thus, restrained review ["traditional test"] might be applied when a state
disqualifies by requiring a fee from all persons desiring a driver's license
or a university education, whereas strict review is applied when Indigents
are disqualified from voting through a fee imposed for the exercise of that
right.
68. See e.g., State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971), discussed in the text
accompanying notes 68-72 infra.

NOTES

Schoonfield,59 whose reasoning was expressly adopted by the majority in Tate v. Short.60 However, the principle expressed in Williams
v. Illinois,61 that, "[o]nce the State has defined the outer limits of
incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum
S. .62 would have been a sufficient basis in itself for holding Tate's
incarceration violative of the Equal Protection Clause.6s In Tate the
"outer limit" of incarceration set by the State was a fine. Therefore, the broader language adopted in the opinion qualifies as dictum
and is not necessarily binding on the lower courts. The Supreme
Court of Ohio has applied Tate to find imprisonment of an indigent
for nonpayment of his fine unconstitutional, even though the resulting period of confinement was within the maximum statutory period
set for the substantive offense. 64 However, the dissenting judge would
have distinguished Tate in that it involved confinement beyond the
statutory maximum.6 5
One further problem in gauging the scope of Williams and Tate
remains. Both cases dealt with statutes which were construed by the
Court as a "means of enabling the Court to enforce collection of
money that a convicted defendant was obligated by the sentence to
pay."6 7 In State v. DeBonis,68 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
pointed out that it had construed its statute calling for imprisonment
for nonpayment as having been intended by the legislature "to further a penal objective by subjecting a defendant to one sting instead
of another that failed. '69 The question thus arose whether that court
would be compelled to follow the Williams and Tate equal protection
holdings which were based on statutes having as their purpose compelling payment, not a substitute punishment. The New Jersey Court
read Williams as finding an invidious discrimination "in the denial
to the defendant of the opportunity to raise the moneys and thereby
to experience the same punishment which would be his if he had
sufficient funds on hand. ' 7 0 It therefore reversed the municipal court
59. Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 (1970) (concurring opinion).
60. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
61. Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
62. 1d. at 241-42.
63. See text accompanying note 66 infra.
64. In re Jackson, 26 Ohio St. 2d 51, 268 N.E.2d 812 (1971). The California Supreme
Court had already held imprisonment of an indigent because of his inability to pay a fine
violative of the Equal Protection Clause even though the resulting confinement is less
than the statutory maximum set for the substantive offense. The decision was based on
the stricter equal projtection test and held that the imprisonment was not necessary to
promote the state's asserted interest. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 255 (1970).
65. In re Jackson, 26 Ohio St. 2d 51, 268 N.E.2d 812, 814 (1971).
66. Id.
67. Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235, 240 (1970).
68. State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971).
69. Id. at 145.
70. Id. at 143-44.
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for denying the defendant an opportunity to pay his fine in reasonable installments71
It has been pointed out that a sentencing court might be able
to deny an indigent defendant his constitutional rights as announced
in the Williams and Tate decisions by simply imposing an original
sentence of imprisonment on those unable to pay a fine.72 This would
create a difficult problem of proof for the indigent who would then
have to prove that his imprisonment was due to his indigence and
not imposed because of a judicial determination that imprisonment
is the appropriate punishment.7 3 However, under the New Jersey
court's application of Williams and Tate, failure of the sentencing
court to allow the fine to be paid in installments is itself a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.7 4 Appelate courts should be able
to review the merits of the sentence imposed as easily as they can
decide whether it was unconstitutional or not to allow the fine to be
paid in installments.
It must also be remembered that in order for a defendant to
assert a denial of equal protection under Williams and Tate he will
75
have to demonstrate to the sentencing court that he is an indigent.
In Harris v. United States,76 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia said that a motion to vacate or modify the
judgment, alleging indigency, was necessary if the defendant wished
the trial judge to take into account his inadequate financial condition. 77 Failure to do so may amount to a waiver.
THE FUTURE OF THE FINE AS A PENAL SANCTION
If fining is a legitimate penal objective, the courts must be able
to impose a fine on all offenders, indigent as well as affluent. Traditionally, there have been several bases for imposing criminal sanctions, viz., retribution, rehabilitation, incapacitation and deterrence.
Retribution is now largely discouraged as a penal objective.7 But
even assuming its legitimacy, there are few situations in which its
purpose could be achieved by a fine standing alone. Perhaps a fine
71. Id. at 147.
court costs. "[Iln
cannot be deemed
72. 16 VILL. L.
78. Id.
74.

State v.

The New Jersey Court distinguished imprisonment for nonpayment of
the absence of a statute making 'costs' a part of punishment, costs
to seek a punitive end."
Pfv. 754, 763 (1971).

DeBonis, 58

N.J. 182,

276 A.2d

137

(1971).

This again

emphasizes the

importance of determining which equal protection test the United States Supreme Court
used to reach its decisions in Williams and Tate. Both equal protection tests are based
to some degree on the "purpose" of the statute. However, there might be a different conclusion as to the constitutionality of a statute having as its purpose substituted
punishment, if a particular equal protection test was invoked by the Court
75. Harris v. United States, 440 F.2d 240, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Case affirmed because no showing of indigency had been made in the trial court).
76. Harris v. United States, 440 F.2d 240, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
77. Id. at 241. The Court pointed out that this was the procedure employed in Wilhams.
78.

See

MICHAEL

& WEHsLER,

CRIMINAL LAw

AND ADMINISTRATION

4-17

(1940).
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would avenge an embezzlement or other crimes where greed is a
motive,79 but in the typical case it would have little impact in terms
of retribution. Likewise a fine is not well suited to the purposes of
rehabilitation or incapacitation, since the offender is neither treated
nor confined. Fines are therefore justifiable from a penological standpoint primarily as a deterrent. 80 It has been said that the imposition of a fine probably does have some deterrent effect when imposed as the sole penalty for an offense."'
In determining what reform is needed in the present sentencing

practices of the courts there are other considerations besides the
efficacy of the fine as a penal practice. [t seems that often the fine
is imposed as a negative alternative to the other punishments available. Since the 18th century, virtually all commentators have criticized the use of short-term imprisonment as a penal sanction.8 2 Since
fines are most often used as a penalty for minor infractions, their
abolition might well result in a substantial increase in the number
of offenders sentenced to short-term confinement. This is a highly
undesirable prospect, and one that in itself supports the continued
use of the fine as a criminal sanction, without regard to its penological effectiveness."
The abolition of fines would deprive the sentencing process
of much flexibility, for this form of punishment can be easily tailored
to the individual defendant so as to avoid injus4
tice.8
There are also financial considerations in determining when to
79. Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1013, 1018 (1953).
80. They are also sometimes used as a means of making restitution to the victim.
However, this is more properly an aim of the civil, than the criminal law.
81. Note, 101 U. PA. I REv. 1013, 1018 (1953). The same commentator has pointed
out that where the sentence is imprisonment plus a fine it is difficult to assign any great
deterrent power to the fine, if the imprisonment itself is Insufficient to restrain the potential offender.
82.
ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVEs AND PROCEDURES 120 (1968); PRESmENT'S COMM'N
ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COUrRTS

(1967); G. PLAYFAiR & D. SINGTON, CRIME PUNISHMENT AND CURE 20-21 (1965) ; Comment, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 778, 793 (1969).
83. Not all writers have acknowledged the "crime school" effect of short-term imprisonment. Justice Blackmun, in concurring in Tate, observed that the Court's holding
that it was unconstitutional to imprison an indigent for non-payment of a fine "[m]ay
well encourage state and municipal legislatures to do away with the fine and to have
the jail term as the only punishment for a broad range of traffic offenses. Eliminating
the fine whenever it is prescribed as alternative punishment avoids the equal protection
issue that indigency occasions and leaves only possible eighth amendment considerations.
If, as a nation, we ever reach that happy point where we are willing to set our personal
convenience to one side and we are really serious about resolving the problem of traffic
Irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways, a development of
that kind may not be at all undesirable." Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (concurring opinion). This argument is unsound because it begs the question. It assumes that
the higher the penalty, the lower will be the rate of occurrence of the crime, and on that
basis proposes stricter penalties. But the lower occurrence of crime is the very thing
that must be shown to support a policy of stricter penalties. Nowhere is the reader given
cause to believe that stricter penalties will ensure safety on the highways, or serve any
other purpose.
84. State v. Tackett, 483 P.2d 191, 192 (Hawaii 1971).
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use a fine as opposed to imprisonment as a penalty for criminal
conduct. Although raising revenue for the state is not a direct purpose of fining, it is a welcomed by-product. When the offender is
imprisoned, not only does the state lose revenue it would have added
if a fine had been imposed, but it also incurs the expense of housing and feeding him, as well as possibly supporting his family through
state welfare programs while he is incarcerated. The average cost
in the United States of imprisoning an adult offender for one year
is $2,000.85 The overall costs of an efficient administration of criminal
justice is so high that it is already beyond the amount that many
states are willing to appropriate for the purpose. 8 Existing budgets
should not be further strained by a deluge of new prisoners, unless
it can be clearly shown that such a policy will further some other
87
more compelling interests of the state.
There are also instances in which the fine is the only realistic
punishment available, e.g., violations of the criminal law by corporations whose officers are not individually liable. Since there is no one
available to imprison, the fine must be employed to deter the corporation from committing further infractions.
The fine will in all probability continue to be employed extensively as a criminal sanction. Assuming this to be true, and recognizing that it has now been declared unconstitutional to imprison an
indigent for nonpayment of a fine or court costs,88 it is timely to
consider possible alternatives to the existing fining system.
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
It is incumbent upon the states to find alternatives to imprisoning indigents for nonpayment of fines or court costs. In Tate v.
Short,89 the Supreme Court re-emphasized its admonition in Williams
to the effect that this can and must be done:
The State is not powerless to enforce judgments against
those financially unable to pay a fine; indeed, a different
result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would
enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment
for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other conviction."
85.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 15

AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, TASK

(1967). The average daily cost per capita for each inmate
at Oahu State Prison, Hawaii, for the year 1969-70 was $19.86. State v. Tackett, 483 P.2d
191 (Hawaii 1971).
86. For an illustration of the consequences of over burdened facilities see the description of the Arkansas penal situation in Holt v. Sarver, 809 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
87. Imprisonment of those convicted of minor traffic violations would call for such
great increases in Jail space that it would not be feasible to accommodate all offenders
without construction of addtional facilities.
88. See text accompanying notes 29-52 supra.
89. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
90. Id. at 399.
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Although the Court did not intimate the precise legislation that would
enable the state to enforce judgments against those financially unable to pay a fine, it did imply that there were schemes available
that would be effective and still not violate the indigent's rights to
equal protection of the law:
It is unnecessary for us to canvass the numerous alternatives to which the State by legislative enactment-or judges
within the scope of their authority-may resort in order to
avoid imprisoning an indigent. . . for involuntary nonpayment of a fine or court costs. Appellant has suggested several plans, some of which are already utilized in some States,
while others resemble those proposed by various studies. The
State is free to choose from among the variety of solutions
already proposed and, of course, it may devise new ones.9 1
1. INSTALLMENT PLANS FOR THE PAYMENT OF FINES
Among the plans impliedly endorsed by the Court was a procedure for payment of fines in installments. Some such plans were already then being used in various states. 92 Under the installmentplan the fine is paid in the same manner that a purchase is made
on a conditional sales contract. Payments are spread out over a period of time, taking into consideration the amount of income the indigent is expected to have 3 and such other things as the size of
the family he must support. There is no reason why the family of
the offender should suffer deprivation when they themselves have
not violated the law.
In setting up the amount of installments the court would be in a
similar position to the businessman who deals with the poor. The
huge volume of sales of consumer products that is transacted on the
basis of installment payments is a realization that certain segments
of the population do not find themselves able to accumulate large
sums of money at any one time. By being able to spread payments
91. Id. at 399-400, citing Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235, 244-245 (1970).
92. In a footnote the Tate Court cited the following statutes as examples of then existing installment-plans for the payment of fines: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 (1970) (misdemeanors)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4332(c) (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, §
4(a) (2) (Supp. 1970); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § IA (1959) ; N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. § 470-d(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953 (1964); and
,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.070 (1961). Other examples of existing installment-plans
are: N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 166-15 (1953)
(misdemeanors); OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. §
2947.11 (Baldwin 1964) (misdemeanors) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-593(6) (1962)
(fines as
a condition of probation) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953) (fines as a condition of
probation). Proposed legislation for fines to be payable in installments Includes: MODEL
PENAL CODE § 302.1(1) (1962) ; ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURE § 2.7(b)
(1968). All of these laws and proposals make the allowance of installment payments discretionary with the Judge. It is the opinion of this writer that allowing payment to be
made in installments should be mandatory.
93. It seems that all income, including payments under the various welfare programs,
that inure to the benefit of the offender, should be included as income for these purposes. Welfare payments that are essentially for the benefit of other members of the
offender's family should be excluded in oonsidering the amount of the fine to assess.
See also State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971).
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over an extended period, many consumers are encouraged to purchase products that they might otherwise feel themselves unable to
afford. Similar reasoning supports the use of installment-plans for
the payment of fines. If the offender feels that the fine has been assessed in installments that are within his ability to pay, he may be
encouraged to make a greater effort to pay the fine. Indeed, it has
been said that the states which currently have provision for installment payment of fines achieve a higher rate of collection. 94 The installment-plan method has also been supported on other grounds:
This procedure [collection of fines in installments] has
been widely endorsed as effective not only to collect the fine
but also to save the expense of maintaining a prisoner and
avoiding the necessity of supporting his95 family under the state
welfare program while he is confined.
Of course the use of installment payments requires a greater inquiry
on the part of the court into the background of the offender to determine the amount of the installments, and the intervals at which
payments should fall due. However, these administrative costs seem
small compared to the costs of confinement of the offender, and also
seem inevitable in light of the Supreme Court's position:
We are not unaware that today's holding may place a
further burden on States in administering criminal justice
. . . But the constitutional imperatives of the Equal Protection Clause must have priority over the comfortable convenience of the status quo.9 6
Allowing payments to be made in installments would greatly increase
the amount of a fine that a court could constitutionally impose upon
an indigent. By making payment possible within the limited means
of the indigent, the equal protection deficiency in imprisoning an indigent for failure to pay is removed.9 7 The deterrent effect of the
fine would not be diminished since the court can impose a greater
fine through installments, and the consequences of the fine upon the
offender would seem to be just as great since he will be forced to
94.
Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1013, 1023 (1953). See also Note, Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look at the Law and the Constitution, 22 VANTD.
L. REv. 611, 625 (1969). But see 16 VILL. L. RIv. 754 (1971).

95. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400-05 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes
43-52 supra. Cf. State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971) where it is said
that failure of the sentencing court to allow payment of a fine to be made In reasonable
installments is a violation of the Indigent's right to equal protection.
96.

Williams v.

Ill., 399 U.S.

235,

245

(1970).

97. This is because there Is no constitutional difficulty in imprisoning one who willfully refuses to pay a fine. In Tate the court made this clear.
We emphasize that our holding today does not suggest any constitutional
infirmity In imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a fine
who refuses or neglects to do so.
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 3950, 400 (1971).

NoTEs
think about the crime he has committed over a longer period of time
than if he had paid the fine immediately in one lump sum.
The advantages of installment-payment of fines over requiring
immediate payment has been summarized as: "(1) avoidance of the
evils of short-term imprisonment; (2) actual collection of more fines,
thus increasing the retributive and deterrent effects of the penalty
and adding to revenues; (3) decrease of mounting prison maintenance expenses; (4) probable decrease in costs of aid given prisoners'
families by welfare departments." To this list can now be added,
(5) avoiding having the indigent escape punishment completely by a
judicial determination that his imprisonment is unconstitutional. 8
If legislation is not forthcoming, appellate courts, within the
scope of their authority, may ensure that defendants have an opportunity to pay their fines in installments. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has said: "[W]e find the following course to be appropriate.
If a defendant is unable to pay a fine at once, he shall, upon showing of that inability, be afforded the opportunity to pay the fine
in reasonable installments consistent with the objective of achieving
the punishment the fine is intended to inflict." 99
2.

ALLOWING PAYMENT TO BE DEFERRED
UNTIL A LATER TIME

The offender should always be allowed a sufficient amount
of time in which to make payment. Allowing short delays is often
necessary given the economic situation of our time. If the defendant
tells the court that he is now unable to pay the fine, but upon receiving his regular pay check, will be willing and able to do
so, the court should allow the delay. Deferring the due date of
the fine will not only help ease the constitutional difficulty that
arises in fining an offender who is currently without funds, it
will also benefit the more affluent offender.
In 1962, the New York Herald Tribune reported incidents in
which affluent defendants were imprisoned because they were not
carrying with them sufficient cash to pay the small fines imposed
upon them, 00 and although some had checks, New York City Courts
98.

Note, 101 U.

99.

State v.

PA_ L. Rxv. 1013,

DeBonis, 58

N.J. 182,

1023

(1953).

276 A.2d

137,

147

(1971)

also

providing for

installment payment of fines assessed as an incident of probation.

100.

New York Herald Tribune, July 5, 1962, at 1, col. 4:
April 11, 1962 Robert E. Golden . . . a public relations man and a
law-school graduate, appeared at Chief Magistrate's Term Court at 100

Centre St. in the morning to answer to a citation for a traffic offense
a year before. His offense is termed "crosswalk", meaning he had stopped
his car beyond the building line when discharging a passenger at the
subway.
At 2:15 p.m. the verdict was $25 or two days in

jail. He had $18 and a

checkbook with him but his check was refused. Instead he was fingerprinted and put in a cell with about 40 other prisoners. His offer to
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often refused to accept them. 10 1 Due to the public outcry that
resulted when these articles were printed, New York City adopted
a rule allowing offenders 48 hours to pay any fine. The result
was a huge reduction in the number of offenders imprisoned for
0 2
nonpayment of fines.1
A few states already have statutory provision for delayed payment.10 3 For those that do not, such statutes should be enacted.
Their effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if they were enacted
in conjunction with provisions allowing payment to be made in
installments. Allowing a delay may be sufficient protection against
imprisonment for those with moderate income. But in many cases
deferring payment would mean requiring the offender to accumulate
several pay checks to pay his fine on the prescribed date. In
such instances installments would be a much better solution. By
paying each installment the offender would lessen the risk of
spending the periodic income that he received before the date
for payment arrived. Likewise, where the offender is really in
need of a short amount of time to make payment, setting up
an installment program for him would involve the court in unnecessary administrative expenses which could be avoided if both delayed
payment and installment payment programs were available to the
court that imposed sentence.
Even in those states that do not have statutes providing for
delayed and installment payment of fines, judges frequently allow
a delay or set up an installment plan as a matter of judicial
0
authority. 1°
However, in order to provide the objectivity in the
law that equal justice requires, provisions for deferment of payment, and payment in installments should be guaranteed by statute
to the offender.
3. FINING THE DEFENDANT IN PROPORTION TO HIS WEALTH
It is common knowledge that a fine affects the person fined
the other prisoners to sell his $100 watch for the $7 he needed to get
out was greeted with laughter: "If I had $7, I wouldn't be In here!', was
the rejoinder.
Soon afterward he was manacled to another prisoner and taken to the
Tombs because court had closed for the day. There he was held until
6:15 p.m. when he was released.
See Comment, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 778, 816 (1969).
101. Comment, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 778, 816 (1969).
102. Id. at 816-17.
103. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.1 (1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2901 (1953); N.Y. CODE
CRin. Poc. § 470-d (McKinney Supp. 1970); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.12 (Baldwin
1964) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-591 (1962) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953). The federal
government also permits delayed payment and installment plans In connectloln with probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1(1) (1962).
104. State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971) where the New Jersey Supreme
Court exercised judicial authority to require all sentencing courts in that Jurisdiction
to allow payment In Installments.
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in proportion to the amount of money he actually has.10 5 For this
reason many writers have advocated assessing fines which would
be computed on the basis of the offender's wealth. 08 The American
Law Institute has adopted such a proposal:
The court shall not sentence a defendant to pay a fine
unless: (a) the defendant will be able to pay the fine; and
(b) the fine will not prevent the defendant from making
restitution or reparation to the victim of the crime. . . . In
determining the amount and method of payment of a fine,
the Court shall take into account the financial resources of
the defendant10 7and the nature of the burden that its payment
will impose.
This proposal suffers from the same problem that exists where
the trial court has the total discretion of determining whether
the offender should be able to defer payment of his fine, or pay
it in installments. Such broad discretion does not ensure that the
offender will be fairly treated. An abuse of discretion can occur
by oversight, when the judge's discretion is not clearly defined.
Allowing the judge to determine what rights the defendant has
gives no assurance that the defendant has any rights at all. Greater
fairness can be achieved through statutory guidelines providing
standards that can be uniformly administered. 0 8
Opposition to proportional fining can be anticipated on the
grounds that the policy of the law should be to make the fine
equal to the gravity of the offense. But the policy of imposing
a fine in accordance with the gravity of the offense is not necessarily abandoned by the added consideration of how much money
the offender has. One way to accomplish both objectives is to
impose "day-fines."'" 9 Under this system of fining, the court first
sentences the offender to a number of day-fines to be determined
by the gravity of the offense. The number of day-fines for a particular
offense could be established by a statutory range just as monetary
amounts are now often established by the legislature. After the
court has determined the severity of the offense, and on that basis
the number of day-fines, it can then compute the monetary amount
of each day-fine by calculating the offender's per diem income
105. "What is ruin to one man's fortune may be a matter of indifference to another's."
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430 (Wendell's Am. ed. 1847).
106. Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1013, 10,24-26 (1953).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.02(3), (4)
(1962). See also ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 122 (1968)
("the most important suggestion designed to alleviate the problem is that fines be imposed on those who are likely to be able to pay
them").
108. The American Bar Association in its proposals for reforming the fine system, has
urged that legislatures in the United States study the possiblity of using automatic
fining systems

for

certain

offenses.

ABA

SENTENCING

128-29 (1968).
109. Note, 101 U. PA. LA PEv. 1013. 1024 (1953).

ALTERNATIVES

AND

PROCEDURES
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in accordance with uniform standards set by statute. Such legislation is not now in effect in any American jurisdiction. 110 However,
highly successful versions of the day-fine system have already been
introduced in Sweden,"" Finland," 2 Switzerland, "3 and Cuba." 4 These
statutes compute the daily income of the offender with reference
to his financial obligations, the number of his dependents, his productive capacity, and any other factors affecting his wealth. 115 In
adapting the day-fine system to American circumstances, the very
poor would not have to be excluded from the reach of the fine.
Those who are unable to work usually receive some welfare benefits
from the state which should be included as income for purposes
of computing the amount of the fine, except to the extent that
such benefits are intended to aid the family of the offender. The
income for those who chose not to work could be determined with
reference to what they could earn with reasonably diligent effort.
This is currently being done in the European countries utililzing
this system. 1 6 The Swedish statute also provides a minimum fine
of five crowns, or approximately one dollar, and excludes most
minor traffic violations. 1 7 It is questionable whether traffic violations should be exempt from such a system, since the same unfairness exists in arbitrary fining whether the offense is a traffic
violation or some other offense.
The most difficult obstacle to the successful implementation
of a day-fine system in the United States would be the added
administrative burden on the courts. One writer has advocated
the use of prior federal income tax returns to simplify the process
of determining the offender's per diem income." 8 If tax returns
are used for this purpose the offender should be able to refute
their applicability by showing a substantial change in his financial
condition, in which case the court would be required to make
a more extensive inquiry into his current financial state. An administrative system could also be established especially for the
110.

Comment, 57

CALIF.

L.

Rzv. 778, 818

(1969).

111. SvEriGEs RIEms LAG, ST'RAFF-LAG Rap. 2, § 8 (1949), cited in Note, 101 U. PA.
L. REV. 1013, 1025 (1953). In 1932, before this statute was enacted, there were 13,358
people in Swedish prison for nonpaymnt of fines. By 1946 only 286 offenders were imprisoned yearly for nonpayment of fines. T. SELLIN, RECENT PENAL LEGISLATION IN
SWEDEN 14-15 (1947), cited in 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1013, 1024 (1953).
112.

SUPPLEMENT TILL FINLANDS

RIKES LAG No.

36,

§ 4

(1942),

cited in

101 U.

PA.

L. REv. 1013, 1024 (1953).
113. STGB (C.Pen.), § 4, art. 48 (1950), cited in Comment, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 778,
813 (1969).
114. CODIOO DE DEFENSA SOCIAL art. 59, §§ A-E. (1938), cited in Comment, 57 CALIF.
L. REv. 778, 814 (1969).
115. Note, 101 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1013, 1025 (1953).
116. Id. at 1025, n.92.
117. Id. at 1025, n.93.
118.

Comment V,

Equal Protection and the Use

of Fines as

Penalties for Criminal

Offenses, 1966 U. ILL. L. FORUM 460, 465. It should be noted that current restrictions
on the use of income tax returns would prohibit their use for this purpose. INT. REV.
CODE § 6013 (1954).

NoTEs

purpose of determining the offender's financial status. Questionnaires could be filled out by a defendant prior to imposition
of sentence and his answers quickly checked by phone for confirmation. 119 The offender would be able to challenge the court's
assessment of his wealth in a plenary proceeding if the court's
determination was incorrect. But he would also be liable to ad12 0
ditional punishment if he misrepresented his financial condition.

In the case of indigent defendants receiving welfare from the state,
the court could call the assigned case worker of the indigent and
receive whatever information that administrative2 1body already had
acquired as to the defendant's financial status.1

4. IMPRISONMENT FOR NONPAYMENT OF
INSTALLMENTS OR PROPORTIONAL FINES
It must be recognized that even with the added protection
of deferments, payment in installments, and a proportional system
of fining, cases will arise where it would be unfair to imprison
the offender for being in default. The only offender who should
be committed for nonpayment is the one who has willfully refused
to pay. 22 Since the circumstances may well have changed since
the sentence was imposed, the offender should be given a hearing
before commitment and the "willfulness" of his default determined
in light of the circumstances existing at the time the payment
was due.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
imprisonment for nonpayment of an installment would violate the
indigent's right to equal

protection. 1 23

But

if the

defendant

has

done everything within his power to satisfy the fine, and is unable
to do so, it is difficult to see how imprisonment would serve the
state's purpose of compelling collection. The situation cannot fairly
119. Comment, 57 CALIF. L. Rsv. 778, 815 (1969). The writer points out that the
Vera Foundation in New York is employing similar procedures in connection with setting
bail. Employees of the criminal court's probation department question each defendant as
he awaits his appearance before the judge. They prepare a report and verify the answers
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
by phone. See also
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 131-32 (1967).

120. The defendant would be precautioned of the additional penalty in order to encourage
truthfullness in answering questions relating to his wealth. Comment, 57 CALIF L. RIv.
778, 815 (1969).
121. There would be no issue as to an invasion of the defendant's privacy. The
determination as to wealth would not be undertaken until the defendant has pleaded or
been found guilty, the commission of the offense being a waiver of his right to be left
alone.
122.

In

re Antazo,

3

Cal.

3d

100,

115,

473

P.2d

999,

1008-1009,

89

Cal. Rptr.

255

(1970). But see State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137, 146 (1971). "To exonerate
a defendant because he cannot pay the fine would defeat the penological objective of
f,he State and be tantamount to a grant of immunity from penal responsibility."
123. "Nor is our decision to be understood as precluding imprisonment as an enthe
despite
been unsuccessful
forcement method when alternative means have
defendant's reasonable efforts to satisfy the fines by those means; the determination
of the constitutionality of imprisonment in that circumstance must await the presentation of a concrete case." Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400-01 (1971).
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be distinguished from the sentences for nonpayment which the Court
has already found violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 1 24 In
both situations the more wealthy offender could avoid the imprisonment. Moreover, in neither instance could the indigent be coerced
into paying, since by definition, he is unable to do so.
The only rational purpose the state can assert for imprisoning
one who fails to pay a fine is that it is attempting to compel payment. 12 5 Commitment for nonpayment can therefore only serve the
state's purpose if the offender is able to pay but refuses or neglects
to do so. The American Law Institute has recognized that a state
only has justification in imprisoning offenders who willfully default
and has proposed that the defendant in default be allowed to show
cause as to why he has not paid. If the default was found not
to be contumacious, the court would be able to allow additional
time for payment, reduce the amount of each installment, or revoke
all or any portion of the fine remaining unpaid. 26 This would allow
the court to reassess the defendant's ability to pay in light of
subsequent events and avoid the injustice of imposing too great
a burden on the defendant. 127 The defendant should be able to
have his reasons for nonpayment presented to the court by counsel,
and if he cannot afford to pay, counsel should be appointed for
8
him.12
If the offender's failure to pay is found to have been willful,
the court should treat the refusal as it would any other instance
124. See Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235 (1970) ; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971)
discussed in the text accompanying notes 29-52 supra.
125. State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137, 147 (1971) interpreted the New
Jersey statute calling for imprisonment for nonpayment of fines as a substitute punishment. The New Jersey Supreme Court formulated the following policy:
If a defendant fails to meet the installments, he shall be recalled for
reconsideration of his sentence. The court may reduce the fine or suspend
it. or modify the installment plan, or, if none of those alternatives Is
warranted, the court may Impose a jail term to achieve the needed penological objective. If a jail sentence is thus substituted for the fine, the
sentencing judge shall not be obliged to equate a day In Jail with a
statutorily stated dollar amount. On the contrary, such statutes must
be deemed to prescribe only a minimum equivalency. The sentencing
Judge must impose a lesser jail term if it is adequate in the light of the
total circumstances of the individual case.
This approach Is not justifiable. If the sentencing court felt that a fine was a sufficient
criminal sanction when it imposed sentence it is difficult to see how the defendant's
inability to pay the fine converts the state's need into incarceration. The inability to
pay is more probably Indicative of an excessively high fine in light of the offender's
wealth, than it is of futility of the fine as a penal sanction. If the offender has any
money at all, and a fine was considered a sufficient original sentence, it should still
be sufficient at the rehearing on nonpayment, if the defendant's default is noncontumacious. Therefore, the provision in the New Jersey court's opiniop for re-evaluation
of the amount would only be effective to protect a defendant's right to equal protection
if the provision for imprisonment were omitted.
126. Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.2(1), (2) (1962).
127. Under the Model Penal Code proposal the defendant would also be able, on his
own initiative, to petition the court for revocation of all or any unpaid portion of the
fine if there was a change of circumstances since the imposition of the fine that would
make it unjust to require further payment in accordance with the original sentence.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.3 (1962).
128. Comment, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 778, 820 (1969).

NOTES

of disobeying a court order, and impose sentence accordingly. Imprisonment based on the amount of the fine originally imposed
would be undesirable because it would not in every case be suited
to the gravity of the offender's refusal to pay.129 The court should
not be compelled to impose a prison sentence in all cases. If
merely imposing an additional fine is a sufficient penalty under
the circumstances for the willful13 0failure to pay the original fine,
the court should be able to do so.'
When the default is found to be contumacious, the state should
be allowed to employ any means that would be available to collect
an unpaid civil judgment. 13 1 If the offender is imprisoned for his
willful refusal, the fine should still be collected through civil processes such as garnishment and execution. To allow the fine to
be discharged by the commitment for nonpayment would be to
allow the refusal to pay to go unpunished. 132 The punishment for
the refusal to pay should be based on the seriousness of that
refusal. The sentence is in the nature of a sentence for contempt
and should bear no relationship to the punishment for the actual
substantive crime.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that it will
closely scrutinize the constitutionality of statutes which result in
imprisonment of indigents for nonpayment of fines which other
defendants could have avoided by payment. The state's purpose
in compelling payment cannot be achieved by imprisonment, and
thus fails to meet the test of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Most states must therefore turn to new
means of collecting fines from indigents. The delayed payment,
and installment-plan methods, already in use in several states,
have been impliedly endorsed by the Supreme Court as constitutional alternatives to current practices. 3 3 Legislatures may also
find it desirable to experiment with legislation in the area of fines,
such as establishing a system of proportional fines. The "day-fine"
system, already successfully employed in several European countries, might be copied and adapted to local conditions.
129. See State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137, 147 (1971). See also ABA
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROcEDUREs 284-85 (1968).
130. Comment, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 778, 820 (1969).
131. MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.2(1) (1962) ; ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 285 (1968).
132. Comment, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 778, 820 (1969), cites both the American Law Institute and American Bar Association proposals as allowing the imprisonment to discharge the duty to pay the fine. The author of the Comment points out that this allows
either the original crime, or the contempt to go -unpunished since it, in effect, provides
an alternative to the original sentence.
133. Text accompanying note 92 supra.
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Should the legislatures fail to act to reform those practices
which have now been declared unconstitutional, it will be up to
judges, within the scope of their discretion, to provide equal protection when assessing fines. In undertaking this effort it should
be borne in mind that for a fine to have an equal impact upon
the poor and the affluent it must be collected in such a way
that all will be able to pay without undue hardship. Moreover,
any fine should be imposed in proportion to the offender's wealth
in order to provide an equal punitive and deterrent effect.
EDWARD J. WARD

